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Impact of the Sudanese Humanitarian Crisis on Society and the Economy After 2023

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ABSTRACT

The article aims to explain the repercussions of the Sudanese humanitarian crisis on society and the economy after 2023, the year in which the civil war started from the capital, Khartoum.
Research into the repercussions of the current humanitarian crisis revealed it to be the most serious in the world, with millions of people suffering from severe food shortages.
in the capital and many cities and rural areas.
Social inequality has contributed to the emergence and continuation of the humanitarian crisis, and it may contribute later to larger crises if its aspects are not addressed.
The economic slowdown contributed to the contraction of the local economy and weakened production. Rising fuel prices exacerbated the humanitarian crisis by increasing the economic burden on society. Furthermore, the devaluation of the Sudanese pound weakened purchasing power.
Regarding food prices, we find that they have risen significantly compared to what they were before 2023, which means that millions of Sudanese are facing food shortages and severe food insecurity.
A number of local and foreign organizations provided aid, but it was insufficient for survival, and despite its scarcity, it did not reach many people.
The resilience of local communities is attributed to support from relatives within the country, and to support from relatives working outside Sudan. Rain-fed agricultural production has also contributed to mitigating food shortages

ARTICLE DETAILS

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INTRODUCTION

The Sudanese economy depends on agricultural production, which comes first and achieves the largest share in terms of national income, followed by livestock and forestry production with smaller shares. This was the case until recently. (Al-Shami, 2000, pp. 457-458).

One of the problems of the Sudanese economy is the continued decline in the prices of the raw materials it produces, and the continued rise in the prices of manufactured goods and imports that meet the needs of the population, a problem in which production is deteriorating. (Ibid,p. 464).

The civil war in South Sudan in the 1980s caused widespread destruction of productive resources, leading to poverty, displacement of families, and famine.

The agricultural sector was also destroyed due to insecurity in rural areas where 90% of the population of South Sudan lived. Other agricultural sectors were destroyed or their production area was
reduced in the Blue Nile, Kordofan and Darfur regions. Refugees from neighboring countries put pressure on jobs, social services and food supplies. Drought exacerbated the deteriorating situation and increased the suffering of the population. (Ahmed, 1995, p. 17).

Historically, the Sudanese economy was rooted in the capitalist system, completely neglecting the way people organize their production. This system undoubtedly achieved economic growth but not development. (Ahmed, n.d., p. 155).

In rural communities, a subsistence economy prevails, where people often work to meet their basic needs. Some local civil society organizations have worked to support operations in these rural communities, but the success rate has been low due to the weak social organization in many of these communities. (Interview with, S.D., 2021).

In the context of the relationship between conflict and the economic system in the Blue Nile region of southeastern Sudan, for example (a region that has suffered from armed conflict since the 1980s), we find that the conflict affected the economy in several ways: Mr. K.A. stated, "The Blue Nile region was an agricultural region before the armed conflict, as the region's economy was based on agricultural production. The conflict caused the displacement

and refuge of citizens from their areas, and consequently, agriculture stopped." The collapse of the economy, which was based on agriculture, resulted in many people losing their agricultural lands due to displacement. (Interview with K.A., 2018).

J.M. added, "Citizens in displacement and refugee camps have become heavily dependent on aid provided by local and international civil society organizations, and this has led to the spread of a culture of consumption and the disruption of production." (Interview with J.M., 2018).

T.A. believes that one of the effects of the conflict on the economy is “the destruction of mining activity and traditional herding in the region. People have abandoned gold mining areas due to the lack of security, and traditional herding has stopped due to the lack of security.” (Interview with T.A., 2018).

One of the effects of the conflict on the economy is the spread of poverty as a result of the cessation of agricultural work on which the population in remote rural areas depended, and this caused an increase in theft, looting and crime in the region. This was explained by A.J. (Interview with A.J. 2018).

Secondary school teacher A.M. also linked the

school dropout process in the region to the low level of economic income, as parents could not send their children to school and preferred to send them to work to earn income to help with the family’s needs. (Interview with A.M., 2018).

Ms. F.M. confirmed that one of the effects of the conflict on the economy is child marriage, as families resort to marrying off their daughters due to financial hardship. Ms. F.M. stated that approximately 62% of child marriages in Sudan are found in the Blue Nile region. (Interview with F.M., 2018).

“Before the outbreak of armed conflict, the Blue Nile region contributed significantly to the national income through agricultural crops such as sesame, maize, corn, and others, and through livestock and minerals, especially gold. However, after the conflict, this contribution declined and became a small percentage only in the areas controlled by the government,” says Ms. H.A., 2018).

The economic collapse resulting from the conflict led to the entry of Western civil society organizations under the pretext of providing assistance to citizens. (Interview with, A.E. 2021).

In linking the impact of conflict on society in its economic behavior, we find that the economic sociologist Mark Granovetter confirms that the

impact of society on individual behavior is somewhat mechanical; once we know the social class of the individual or the sector of the labor market, everything else in behavior is automatic. (Granovetter, 1985, p. 486).In this context, social classes become unemployed due to the collapse of the agricultural, mining and pastoral economy, and uneducated generations that depend on subsidies automatically adopt this behavior.

One of the effects of the conflict was the influx of substantial aid provided by foreign organizations to citizens in many areas. However, the central government in Khartoum accused them of having other objectives, which led to the expulsion of many of these organizations. The expulsion of these organizations resulted in many economic problems because they constituted an economic resource for many citizens during the conflict, given the government's shortcomings. Mr. M.B. told us (Interview with M.B., 2018).

Hagmann, Deputy Regional Director for Arab States at the International Labour Organization (2021), states: "The effects of recent economic shocks, political unrest, conflict and war have exacerbated child labor levels compared to previous levels in many Arab countries." In Sudan, the rate of child labor participation reached 19.2%. (Middle East and

North Africa: Conflict and mass displacement increase child labour (ilo.org)12/8/2021).

An international report investigated that even before the current civil war since April 2023, wars like those that occurred in Darfur (since 2003) had further deepened the economic crisis (Keen, 2024, pp. 3, 4).

The Norwegian Refugee Council conducted a detailed report on the humanitarian crisis in Sudan two years after the start of the 2023 war, describing it as the most severe humanitarian crisis in the world. Millions of people were on the brink of famine, and internal displacement was the highest in the world. Civilians faced horrific hardships; some of the suffering could be measured, but much remained hidden due to blockades imposed by warring parties, and large segments of the population were inaccessible. (Public Report April 2025, Sudan Crisis, two Years on, The unraveling of the world’s largest humanitarian disaster from the Sahel to the Red Sea). https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/sudan-crisis-two-years-on-report/sudan-crisis-two-years-on_report.pdf, 1.02.2026).

Regarding the conflict and the deepening humanitarian food crisis, the EU report focuses on Key points, part of a series examining the links between conflict and hunger - focuses on reported conflict-related incidents involving food-related

violence in Sudan between 15 April 2023 and 30 November 2024. These incidents included the damaging and destruction of markets and food production factories by explosive weapons use and arson; the looting of markets, food aid and livestock; and incidents of violence directly affecting people at markets and travelling to and from markets. Other factors undermining food security included blockades disrupting food supply chains and humanitarian food aid deliveries, and restrictions on access to agricultural land due to insecurity. (The Sudan Crisis How Over a Year of Violence and Humanitarian Access Restrictions Have Produced Famine Conditions, 2025, https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The-Sudan-Crisis-How-Over-a-Year-of-Violence-and-Humanitarian-Access-Restrictions-Have-Produced-Famine-Conditions-January-2025.pdf, 1.02.2026).

With the conflict reaching the agricultural heartland of central Sudan, Gezira State, at the end of 2023, the war and the resulting human insecurity posed a major obstacle to food production in Sudan. The cessation of agricultural activity in Gezira State led to the destruction of one of Sudan's most important food production centers, upon which the country and some neighboring states depend for their food security. Agricultural production in Gezira remained
halted for nearly a year, and its effects continue to this day. (Interview with: N.S.A., 2025).

The latest UN report states that the ongoing conflict has impacted the Sudanese economy in several ways: the exploitation of natural resources and trade routes is now funding the continuation of the war in Sudan.

The gum arabic trade serves as an example of how global supply chains are linked to the war economy.

Workers in the gum arabic sector face threats, arbitrary detention, looting, and extortion, severely impacting their livelihoods.

The conflict has reshaped gum arabic trade routes, with quantities being smuggled through neighboring countries and re-exported, making it difficult to trace their origin.(https://news.un.org/ar/story/2026/07/1145036. 18.07.2026).

One of the most prominent features of this collapse was the closure of hundreds of factories, particularly in the capital, Khartoum, and Gezira State, which represent the industrial and agricultural heartland of the country.

The Sudanese pound also continued its freefall against foreign currencies, leading to soaring inflation and a dramatic erosion of citizens' purchasing power.(https://www.aljazeera.net/ebusiness/2026/5/7/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A. 18.07.2026).

The UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, Denise Brown, affirmed that the people of Sudan continue to face a humanitarian crisis of immense scale and prolonged suffering that has far exceeded what any civilian population can endure.

In a statement marking three years since the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan, she warned that civilians are paying the heaviest price; homes, markets, hospitals, and schools have been destroyed, and drone strikes have become a daily reality in populated areas. Brown stated that attacks targeting healthcare facilities are frequent, resulting in the deaths of patients and medical personnel and disrupting life-saving services. (https://news.un.org/ar/story/2026/04/1144519. 18.07.2026).

Sudan suffers from recurring fuel crises exacerbated by the destruction of oil infrastructure, particularly the shutdown of the Al-Jaili refinery in Khartoum State, which used to cover about 70% of domestic consumption, forcing the country to rely entirely on imports.The continued decline in the value of the local currency against the dollar is also reflected in the rising prices of fuel and many essential goods. (https://sudantribune.net/article/315363. 18.07.2026).

ARTICLE METHODOLOGY

The article follows the approach of economic sociology, which integrates social (historical and qualitative) and economic (analytical and deductive) approaches to study economic phenomena within their social contexts, using qualitative tools to understand the interactions between individuals and economic and social systems, with a focus on the social analysis of (economic slowdown, currency devaluation, rising food prices and rising fuel prices).Within the context of Sudanese society in the post-2023 period, there are two issues that have affected the humanitarian crisis: armed conflict and social inequalities, and this has been reflected in the economy.

The historical method (which studies the evolution of economic phenomena over time to understand their current roots) is used here to examine the aforementioned economic phenomena and understand their current roots in Sudanese society.

The qualitative approach here helps us gain a deeper understanding of the meanings, motivations, and social interactions associated with economic systems.

The tools of this approach include interviews, observation, and the study of documents (records and reports). We conducted several targeted interviews, and to avoid repetition, we have listed the most important ones.

The aim of the curriculum is to link economic actions to their social contexts, and to explain how culture, institutions, and power shape economic behavior and vice versa.

ARMED CONFLICT

The conflict in Sudan that began in 2023 between rival elements of the security forces has fueled the world's largest displacement crisis and largest hunger crisis. The war has pushed over 12 million people from their homes. More than half the population, over 25 million people, reportedly face acute food insecurity, and famine is spreading. The warring parties have been implicated in atrocity crimes and other gross human rights abuses.

Fatality figures are not reliable, given access constraints, but by some estimates as many as 150,000 people may have died in the first year of the conflict alone. (The War and Humanitarian Crisis in

Sudan,p.1, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12816/IF12816.5.pdf, The War and Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan, 2025, 14.01.2026).

As the conflict has been ongoing for a long time, now approaching three years, a large number of schools have been destroyed or damaged. Today, an estimated one-third of schools are no longer usable. Approximately 11% of schools are being used for other purposes. There are teachers who have fled the country, and there is a need for books and educational materials. Therefore, the situation is difficult in terms of continuing education, as nearly 5 million children have been forced to flee their homes since the beginning of the conflict. Displacement, of course, leads to deprivation in many ways. It is therefore difficult for them and their parents to ensure the continuation of their education, as displacement disrupts access to teachers, schools, and educational materials. Of course, the longer children are out of school, the more difficult it becomes to bridge the gap. It's a dire situation. (UNICEF warns of a "lost generation" in Sudan: 8 million children out of school after 1,000 days of war.)(https://news.un.org/ar/interview/2026/01/1144087?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQPMjc1MjU0NjkyNTk4Mjc5AAEe4JspZET_bftiq5UkMJAN_TKwbvZa4KvvDWfFuEF06Q4uucOCN36UrohBIMU_aem_jbCh6QLH_Nk_-Pgfk5oLFg

.(24.01.2026

Our source, a food supply driver, explains that the armed conflict in the Kordofan and Darfur regions has torn apart the social fabric and dismantled rural and urban communities through large-scale displacement, with each ethnic group relocating to their original communities or to similar ethnic groups, resulting in ethnically based population clusters.

The displaced people faced great difficulties in reaching safe areas, as they often arrived in new areas with nothing, and faced incredible difficulties in obtaining aid, but the resilience of the host communities contributed greatly to meeting many needs, especially food. (Interview with W. Kh., January 2025).

Regarding investigations and sanctions

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating the ongoing conflict since July 2023. Its Deputy Prosecutor reported in July 2025 that the ICC has 'reasonable grounds' to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity are being committed in Darfur. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-led government accused the United Arab

Emirates (UAE) of being complicit of genocide in the region, but the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed the case, as the UAE does not recognise the ICJ's jurisdiction over disputes related to the Genocide Convention.UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2791 (2025) has extended the sanctions (assets freezes, travel bans), and an arms embargo already in place regarding the situation in Darfur, until September 2026. However, this resolution does not include clear reference to the surge in conflict-related sexual violence and the role of mercenaries across Sudan since April 2023. This is notably due to Russia's opposition. Russia abstained on most of the UNSC resolutions on Sudan since the outbreak of the conflict – notably Resolution 2736 (2024) demanding that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher. (Understanding the war in Sudan,The human cost of geopolitics, p. 6, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/779180/EPRS_BRI(2025)779180_EN.pdf, 14.01.2026). It should be noted that sanctions may reduce the flow of weapons to the warring parties, but in reality they are ineffective in stopping the war and its repercussions on Sudanese society.

The warring parties deliberately obstructed the delivery of aid, in violation of international humanitarian law. The international aid presence in conflict-affected areas remained minimal. UN experts accused both sides in June of using starvation as a weapon of war.

The Sudanese Armed Forces authorities, particularly its military intelligence, imposed numerous arbitrary bureaucratic restrictions that hampered the work of humanitarian organizations and their ability to reach those in need.(https://www.hrw.org/ar/world-report/2025/country-chapters/sudan. 18.07.2026).

SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

The war that began as a fight for power between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF, the military) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has roots in how Sudan has been ruled, primarily by military regimes and central elites, since independence. (The War and Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan, 2025, ibid). Social inequalities among different segments of society have contributed to the continuation of the war, as these groups support the warring factions. Areas controlled by armed groups have become sources of manpower and material support for each side. Community leaders typically enjoy material and other privileges unavailable to others, thus perpetuating and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. (Interview with W.D., Khartoum, January 2026).

Eva Hinds expresses her concern about the loss of education for millions of children and its connection to inequality, saying: "This is deeply troubling for an entire generation. Losing a whole generation of learners threatens to deepen inequality, weaken human capital, and delay recovery for decades to come, so it can have devastating consequences. We are talking about children who did not start the war, but are now paying the heaviest price, being deprived of their fundamental right to education."
(UNICEF warns of a "lost generation" in Sudan: 8 million children out of school after 1,000 days of war)(https://news.un.org/ar/interview/2026/01/1144087?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQPMjc1MjU0NjkyNTk4Mjc5AAEe4JspZET_bftiq5UkMJAN_TKwbvZa4KvvDWfFuEF06Q4uucOCN36UrohBIMU_aem_jbCh6QLH_Nk_-Pgfk5oLFg.
.(24.01.2026
This uneducated generation will be severely affected by technological development and the functions performed by artificial intelligence; Adams uncovers the exploitation on which the world of AI relies. Thriving on logics of expansion and extraction, the great houses of AI together own almost 20 per cent of the global economy. When the cost of a single exascale supercomputer outstrips the GDP of small nations, what hope is there to resist AI superpowers? (Adams, 2026).
In our observation of the future job market, AI will perform millions of jobs that do not require a high level of education or only a secondary education. Those without formal education will be laid off by companies and factories due to a lack of need for their skills.
Developing countries like Sudan could be severely affected by such technological advancements,
highlighting how the humanitarian crisis stemming from educational inequality could create volatile conditions for the future development of the Sudanese state. This could lead to conflicts that threaten social security in the country.

ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN

The economic contraction in the six months of the Sudanese war reached 18%. This caused 2.5 million people to lose their jobs in the private sector. Weak tax collection and the destruction of industrial infrastructure led to an economic slowdown. Economic experts estimate that infrastructure losses in Sudan are more than $60 billion. (https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF/4619606-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AB%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86.18.01.2025.).
Large-scale displacement from areas experiencing
armed conflict has led to an economic slowdown that has affected the entire country of Sudan, through the cessation of productive activities, especially in the agricultural and livestock sectors. Furthermore, insecurity along the main trade routes in western Sudan led to a halt in commercial activity, which in turn caused an economic slowdown. These routes supplied Sudan with agricultural produce for export and domestic consumption; the cessation of this activity resulted in a halt to exports, the closure of local factories, and the dismissal of tens of thousands of workers. (Interview with A.Z., 2026).

RISING FOOD PRICES

Macroeconomic studies paint a bleak picture of the Sudanese economy. A preliminary modeling analysis by the International Food Policy Research Institute's Sudan Strategy Support Programme concluded that the economy could contract by 2023 to nearly half its pre-war size and that more than half of the workforce could lose their jobs. The economic contraction resulting from continued conflict through 2024 will lead to household income losses of up to 40 percent and severe disruptions to Sudan's agri-food system. The cessation of agri-food processing activities and the closure of trade
routes are exacerbating food insecurity. Analysis of the latest war impact scenarios shows that up to 4 million people could fall into poverty, and another 2 million could face malnutrition by 2028 if measures are not taken to protect their livelihoods and food security. The same analysis indicates that these figures could be halved if effective measures were implemented quickly to restore agricultural productivity to pre-conflict levels.(O. Kirwy, K.Siddiq, pp.2, 3, https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/bb090e94-2413-44f6-9eae-97625dd2b7fa/content
.(17.01.2026
Food prices witnessed a significant increase during the period after 2023, especially for basic commodities, exceeding four hundred percent compared to the period before the 2023 war. (Interview, Sh. A.,2026).In Sudan, nearly 25 million people (half of the population) are facing acute food insecurity, with Famineconditions (IPC Phase 5) spreading across the country. Devastating conflict, mass displacement, a collapsing economy, the breakdown of essential social services, severe societal disruptions, and limited humanitarian access are driving this unprecedented deepening and widening of the food and nutrition crisis. (Food Security Update, p. 7, 2025), https://

thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-114-March-14-2025.pdf, 26.01.2026.

A female government employee said: Local communities in Sudan faced major challenges in obtaining food, as many families in Khartoum, central, eastern and northern Sudan did not receive sufficient food aid from international or local organizations such as those provided by the World Food Programme.Some families received short-term aid, which was insufficient for survival. The resilience of communities in the face of food shortages stemmed from remittances from relatives both within and outside the country, as well as from low-wage, informal work that helped people survive. Rain-fed agriculture in eastern, southeastern, and central Sudan also helped alleviate food shortages after industrial production in Khartoum was disrupted for two years. (Interview with F.A., December 2025).

FUEL PRICE HIKES

Farmers in central Sudan reported increased fuel prices, leading to higher agricultural costs which in turn led to higher prices for agricultural products

(Interview with M.A., January 2026). In the general observation of fuel prices, they have doubled by a large percentage, sometimes exceeding four hundred percent, and this has directly affected the transportation of goods and transportation services. Through this, we note that spending on transportation services has often approached half of the worker's income, which is a high percentage that affects the rest of the spending, especially on non-essential services in the eyes of citizens, such as spending on education and clean water.

CURRENCY DEVALUATION

The study investigates the numerous incidents in which the Sudanese pound crashed against other currency. It employed the Foreign Exchange Market Pressure Index (FEMPI) to identify the most import episodes of currency crisis during the period 1972-2012.On this basis, six episodes of currency crisis in Sudan were identified namely in 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1996 and 2012.The study analyzed the behaviors of some economic indicators that served as an early warning system for currency crisis occurrence. These indicators revealed the causes of crises and their economic repercussions. The study has shown that the best theoretical models to explain the currency crisis in Sudan are the first generation models. Accordingly, the currency crisis in Sudan is caused by inadequate economic policy in the first place. Also, the study demonstrates that the crisis in Sudan begins in the external sector and transmits to the real sector and the production sectors and finally transforms into political crisis. Further, it is shown that the Sudanese governments adopted different types of economic policies during the period (1972-2012) ranging from centrally planned to free market economic systems. However, the best economic performance was achieved though the liberalization policies. Moreover, the economic reforms under the IM/World Bank supervision was not successful due to economic and non-economic factors.The study identified he most important indicators that can predict currency crisis in Sudan. These are Inflation rate, money supply growth, current account balance, exports, imports, external debts, debt services as percentage of exports, GDP annual growth rate, international reserves, reserves to money ratio, claims on central government and political crisis (Regime Change).(Bannaga, p. 95, 2012). The decline in the value of the Sudanese pound, coupled with stagnant salaries in both the public and private sectors, has led to a weakening of purchasing

power for non-food items. Money is often used to buy essential goods and life-saving medications. (Interview with A.M., January 2026).

THE SUDANESE POUND EXCHANGE RATE AGAINST THE US DOLLAR

The exchange rate declined by the end of 2023, primarily due to the following:

1. The cessation of banking and corporate operations in Khartoum State and some other states.
2. A decrease in the volume of exports and weak repatriation of export proceeds, leading to a shortage of foreign currency supply and increased demand for foreign currency from speculative importers.
3. The cessation of remittances from expatriates through official channels, which led to a resurgence of the parallel market in Sudan.
4. Increased demand for foreign currency due to the displacement of large numbers of Sudanese to neighboring countries, in addition to the transfer of a significant portion of remittances to those countries because of family residency, thus impacting the supply of foreign currency. (Central Bank of Sudan, Sudanese Economic Developments Report, p. 25, 2023).

RESULTS

The article concluded that the roots of the Sudanese economy are those of the capitalist system. The economy was not built to meet the needs of local communities but rather to satisfy the demands of capitalist forces within the free market economy. It also concluded that the conflict caused major humanitarian and economic crises that impacted the social fabric of Sudanese society.

Agricultural production in rural areas has ceased due to the armed conflict, which has led to internal displacement and external refugee flows. Mining and livestock farming have been disrupted by insecurity.

The cessation of production has resulted in widespread poverty among local communities.
The humanitarian crisis led to school dropout rates due to families' low incomes. The dire economic conditions also resulted in underage girls being married. The humanitarian crisis caused a decline in national income.
Local and international organizations have provided some support to address the food shortages, but the aid is insufficient for survival. The humanitarian crisis has led to child labor, with some children becoming the breadwinners for their families.
The article also concluded that historical social inequalities have deepened the crisis in Sudan, and that future crises could occur if their shortcomings are not addressed, especially in the field of education, due to the thousands of pupils who are out of school.
The economic slowdown also led to a contraction in production, resulting in weak output. Rising fuel prices doubled the economic cost of goods, which in turn led to higher food prices.
The decline in the value of the Sudanese pound has a long history, but it worsened after 2023, resulting in a significant decrease in purchasing power.
The article also concluded that communities' resilience in the face of food shortages and their ability to survive depended on internal and external support from relatives and on rain-fed agricultural production.

CONCLUSION

The article concluded that the repercussions of the Sudanese humanitarian crisis on society and the economy in the post-2023 period are the result of previous interactions in the construction of society and its economic functions. Most of these interactions are negative, such as armed conflicts and violence, which have affected the humanitarian situation in general.
The article concluded that the roots of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan are deeply embedded in Sudanese society.
The Sudanese economy originated from the Western capitalist system during the 19th-century colonial period. This economy created a gap in local communities that were not compatible with the free market economy, which led to armed conflict.The armed conflict has caused major humanitarian crises in remote rural communities.
The article also concluded that the humanitarian crisis in Sudan after 2023 was the most severe in the world, with entire communities displaced from their homes and livelihoods. Millions of Sudanese sought refuge in neighboring countries due to insecurity and the deteriorating humanitarian situation, while millions more within Sudan endured dire economic conditions.
The article concluded that local communities created opportunities for resilience and survival in the face of the repercussions of the humanitarian crisis, represented by resorting to kinship patterns for cooperation and economic interaction in light of the disruption of production systems in conflict zones.
The article concluded that the warring parties' reliance on obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid to areas they do not control aims to put pressure on the opponent, but the greatest victims are civilians.
The country’s natural resources are being smuggled to neighboring countries for export and return to fuel the conflict. A large number of workers in the gum arabic sector are facing difficulties that threaten their survival and are being exploited in prices.

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