

Artificial Intelligence in Parliamentary Activity: Institutional Governance, Transparency and Accountability

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ABSTRACT	ARTICLE DETAILS
The article examines the legal and institutional conditions under which artificial intelligence may be integrated into the activity of a national parliament without eroding the constitutional nature of legislative decision-making. Parliament is analysed in its dual capacity as a regulator of artificial intelligence and as a user of it, and the principle of reflexive consistency is substantiated, according to which the standards that the legislature imposes on other actors must bind its own use of algorithmic tools. Drawing on the resolution and Guidelines of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Council of Europe Framework Convention and the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act, three governance models are distinguished in comparative practice: the administrative-policy model of the United States Congress, the in-house development model of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and the low-risk-first model of the European Parliament and several European legislatures. The national framework of Uzbekistan, formed by the Law of 21 January 2026 on relations arising from the use of artificial intelligence and the programme of the Council of the Legislative Chamber of 13 April 2026, is assessed against these benchmarks, and proposals are formulated concerning a joint act of the chambers, the advisory status of algorithmic expertise, a public register of parliamentary artificial intelligence systems and the parity of deputies' access to such tools. KEYWORDS: artificial intelligence, parliament, legislative process, algorithmic governance, transparency, accountability, deputy's mandate, Inter-Parliamentary Union, EU AI Act, Oliy Majlis, parliamentary oversight	Published On: 23 September 2026 Available on: https://irijsh.com/

INTRODUCTION

Within a remarkably short period the question of artificial intelligence in parliaments has migrated from technological speculation into institutional planning. In October 2024 the 149th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union adopted a resolution on the impact of artificial intelligence on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and two months later the Union published the first global Guidelines for AI in parliaments, addressing legislatures not only as regulators of the technology but as organizations that must govern their own adoption of it [1; 2]. The Guidelines rest on a premise that determines the entire legal problem: artificial intelligence should augment rather than replace human capability, above all in democratic deliberation and decision-making [2]. A parliament that delegates to an algorithm any part of the judgement that the constitution entrusts to elected representatives does not become more efficient; it alters the constitutional identity of the act it produces.

The dual position of the legislature gives this problem a specific structure. Parliament establishes the legal regime of artificial intelligence for society, and at the same time it is an organization that processes enormous volumes of text, records, appeals and data, and therefore an obvious beneficiary of the same technology. The tension between these roles gives rise to what may be called the requirement of reflexive consistency: if the legislature prescribes for others the labelling of machine-generated content, the prohibition of decisions affecting rights that rest solely on algorithmic conclusions and the protection of personal data from automated processing, it cannot exempt its own committees, secretariats and deputies from equivalent obligations without undermining the legitimacy of the rules it has adopted.

For Uzbekistan this tension is no longer hypothetical. The Law of 21 January 2026 on the regulation of relations arising from the use of artificial intelligence introduced a statutory definition of the technology, a duty to label information resources created with its use, a prohibition on decisions concerning human rights and freedoms adopted exclusively on the basis of algorithmic conclusions, and liability for the unlawful processing of personal data by such means [3]. On 13 April 2026 the Council of the

Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis approved a detailed programme for the introduction of artificial intelligence into the activity of the Chamber, extending to drafting, expert examination, parliamentary oversight and work with voters [4]. The purpose of this article is to identify, on the basis of comparative experience, the governance models available to a parliament introducing artificial intelligence, to derive from them the legal requirements that follow from the constitutional nature of parliamentary activity, and to assess the emerging framework of the Oliy Majlis against those requirements.

MAIN ANALYSES

The international normative context is formed by three layers of instruments. The Inter-Parliamentary Union Guidelines constitute the specialized layer: they recommend that each parliament adopt a strategy and a governance structure for artificial intelligence, a code of ethics covering the development, procurement and use of such systems, a risk management framework, rules of data governance and security, and programmes of artificial intelligence literacy for members and staff [2]. The second layer consists of general instruments binding on public authorities. The Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, opened for signature in September 2024, obliges the parties to ensure that activities of public authorities within the life cycle of such systems respect human dignity, transparency, accountability and the integrity of democratic processes [5]. Within the European Union, Regulation 2024/1689 establishes risk-based obligations applicable to public bodies, including transparency duties for generative content; the provisional agreement of May 2026 on the simplification of the Regulation adjusted the timetable for high-risk obligations while shortening the grace period for the marking of artificially generated content, confirming that transparency of machine-generated output remains a non-negotiable element of the European approach even as other requirements are relaxed [6]. The third layer is national parliamentary practice, in which three governance models can be discerned.

The first model, administrative-policy governance, is represented by the United States Congress. In June 2023 the Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives provisionally authorized a single generative tool, the paid version of ChatGPT, for research and evaluation only, with non-sensitive data; in December 2023 the Senate Sergeant at Arms authorized controlled use of three competing services for the same purposes [7; 8]. The Committee on House Administration published a series of flash reports culminating in April 2024 in five institutional guardrails: human oversight and decision-making, clear and comprehensive policies, robust testing and evaluation, transparency and disclosure, and education and upskilling [9]. These were converted in September 2024 into the first House-wide artificial intelligence policy, which lists approved use cases, establishes a procedure for approving new tools, requires the attribution of machine-generated output to its source, prohibits the presentation of unvalidated output to the public and is subject to annual review [8; 10]. The distinctive feature of this model is the separation of functions: policy is issued by the administrative organ, its content is shaped by a standing committee, and members' offices retain autonomy within the approved perimeter. The public objection of a member that his staff should be free to use any tool illustrates the constitutional sensitivity of any limitation on the working methods of elected representatives and explains why the eventual policy was framed as enabling rather than prohibitive [11].

The second model is in-house development, exemplified by the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Since 2019 the Chamber has built the Ulysses suite of tools, which classifies legislative documents, identifies bills similar to a proposal already adopted or rejected, assists in drafting and processes citizens' comments submitted through the participation portal [12; 13]; the Federal Senate has pursued a parallel strategy based on semantic indexing of legal texts [14]. Ulysses now functions as a specialist hub within the Inter-Parliamentary Union Centre for Innovation in Parliament, and its significance for legal analysis lies in the location of control: the models, the training data and the infrastructure belong to the parliamentary institution, so that data sovereignty, auditability and continuity of service are secured institutionally rather than contractually [15]. The price of this model is a permanent technical capacity within the parliamentary administration.

The third model, low-risk-first deployment, is illustrated by the European Parliament, whose Archives Unit developed Archibot, a retrieval-augmented generative assistant answering questions on the basis of more than two million archived documents dating back to 1952 in multiple languages [13; 16]. The archive consists of public data, so that privacy risk is minimal; an inaccurate answer does not block a parliamentary procedure; and the benefit is visible to citizens and members alike. The same sequencing from the periphery to the legislative core characterizes the back-office automation of other European parliaments: the Riigikogu of Estonia automated verbatim records through speech recognition, the House of Representatives of the Netherlands introduced the Speech2Write system producing an almost finished report for human finalization, the Finnish Parliament summarizes documents with artificial intelligence, and the Italian Chamber of Deputies offers a chatbot for querying proceedings while the Italian Senate applies machine learning to the classification of bills and amendments [13; 17]. In each case the human clerk remains the author of the final document, and the algorithm is confined to the preparation of a draft.

The individual level of parliamentary work raises questions that the institutional models do not exhaust. In 2023 a municipal ordinance drafted entirely by a generative model at the request of a councillor in Porto Alegre was adopted unanimously, its origin being disclosed only after enactment [18]. The validity of the act was never in doubt, since it passed through every procedural stage,

yet the concealment of its provenance offended an expectation of transparency that no rule had articulated. The doctrinal answer follows from the nature of the mandate: a deputy who introduces a bill assumes political and constitutional responsibility for its content irrespective of the instruments used in its preparation, and the free mandate does not permit its holder to transfer that responsibility to a machine any more than to an adviser. Sh.Kh.Zulfiqarov, examining the activity of a deputy of the Legislative Chamber in comparative perspective, showed that the effectiveness of the mandate depends on the analytical and expert support available to the deputy, which supports the view that algorithmic assistance is a legitimate resource of the mandate provided that its use is transparent and its output is verified by the deputy [19]. O.Z.Mukhammadjonov's analysis of the organizational and legal foundations of the bicameral parliament emphasized the procedural guarantees securing the authenticity of the will of each chamber, a consideration that acquires new content when drafts and expert conclusions may be machine-generated [20]. Uzbek scholarship on artificial intelligence supplies further concepts: S.S.Bozarov established that liability for the consequences of the operation of such systems must be attributed to identifiable human or institutional actors and that the autonomy of the system cannot serve as a ground for exemption, so that an error in a machine-generated report engages the responsibility of the organ that deployed the system [21]; A.Ubaydullayeva demonstrated the absence of authorship on the part of the system, from which it follows that a draft generated by a parliamentary assistant becomes a document of the parliament only when adopted by a human subject entitled to act on its behalf [22]; and R.R.Khakimov's work on the balance between the branches of power indicates that the technology must strengthen the capacity of the legislature to scrutinize an executive that is itself acquiring algorithmic instruments [23].

Against this background the national framework can be assessed. The strategic foundation was laid by the Presidential Decree of 14 October 2024 approving the Strategy for the development of artificial intelligence technologies until 2030 [24]; the Law of 21 January 2026 supplied the general legal regime [3]; and the decision of 13 April 2026, adopted in execution of the parliamentary resolution of 8 October 2025 on the government hour with the Minister of Digital Technologies, provided the institutional design [4; 25]. Three features of that decision are of particular interest. First, it creates a Project Office for the development of artificial intelligence technologies, entrusts the Committee on Innovative Development and Information Technologies with coordination, assigns to the Institute of Parliamentary Research the definition of quality indicators for the materials produced and charges the Secretariat with cybersecurity compliance, distributing responsibility across political, expert and administrative organs in a manner comparable to the American model [4]. Second, it prescribes for the end of 2026 an official artificial intelligence playbook and ethical rules defining which information may not be entered into public models, guaranteeing the neutrality of algorithmic expertise towards political factions, requiring a special marking of any bill analysed with the assistance of artificial intelligence and securing the retention of data within a sovereign database [4]. Third, it sequences the substantive applications to 2029: an expertise module identifying contradictions between a draft and existing legislation on the red-flag principle, a linguistic system controlling the uniformity of terminology and the elimination of discretion-creating expressions, an automatic comparative table of changes between readings, modules for anti-corruption and gender-legal expertise trained on the methodology of the Ministry of Justice, a conflict-of-interest analyser, an anomaly-detection system for budgetary oversight and a platform for real-time transcription and translation of plenary speech [4]. The programme designates the World e-Parliament Report indicators as the monitoring instrument, directs the study of the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act, names the European Parliament and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea as reference parliaments and provides for an external audit with international certification [4]; in its ambition it approximates the in-house development model of Brazil rather than the incremental approach of most European legislatures.

Comparative assessment nevertheless reveals four points requiring legal reinforcement. The first concerns the level and scope of regulation. The decision of 13 April 2026 is an internal act of the Council of one chamber; it binds neither the Senate, whose committees will receive bills bearing an artificial intelligence marking and whose own analytical work will inevitably be affected, nor the subjects of legislative initiative outside parliament. The constitutional laws on the Legislative Chamber and on the Senate provide the instrument for closing this gap: a joint act of the chambers on the use of artificial intelligence in the activity of the Oliy Majlis, supplemented by amendments to the standing orders of each chamber, would give the playbook and the ethical rules the status of parliamentary law rather than administrative guidance and extend them symmetrically to both chambers [26; 27]. Such an act would also be the place to apply the requirement of reflexive consistency by reproducing, for the parliament itself, the labelling duty and the prohibition of decisions based solely on algorithmic conclusions that the Law of 21 January 2026 imposes on other actors [3].

The second point concerns the legal status of algorithmic expertise. The Law on Normative Legal Acts and the Law on the Anti-Corruption Expertise of Normative Legal Acts and their Drafts define expertise as an activity of designated subjects, conducted according to an approved methodology and producing a conclusion for which the expert body is responsible [28; 29]. The modules envisaged by the programme generate reports, recommendations and red flags; they do not, and constitutionally cannot, produce expert conclusions in the statutory sense. The joint act should therefore state that machine-generated analysis has an advisory character, that the statutory expertise of a draft is completed only by a conclusion signed by the responsible human expert who has examined the algorithmic report, and that a deputy, a committee or a chamber may depart from any algorithmic recommendation without special justification. The programme's proposal to make the artificial intelligence filter obligatory for all bills is compatible with this position only if the obligation attaches to the running of the filter and not to the acceptance of its results [4].

The third point concerns transparency towards the public. The American guardrail of transparency and disclosure and the Inter-Parliamentary Union recommendation on a code of ethics presuppose that citizens can know which algorithmic systems their parliament uses, for what purposes and with what safeguards [2; 9]. The most developed instrument of this kind is the public algorithm register introduced by the Government of the Netherlands in 2022, which describes each algorithmic system used by public authorities, its purpose, its data sources and the responsible official [30]. A parliamentary register of artificial intelligence systems, published on the official web resource of the Oliy Majlis and maintained by the Project Office, would give concrete form to the programme's commitment to open data and allow civil society monitoring organizations to exercise the external scrutiny on which public trust depends; the marking of bills analysed with the assistance of artificial intelligence should, for the same reason, be visible in the published text of the draft.

The fourth point concerns equality within parliament. The programme rightly requires that algorithmic expertise should not favour any political faction [4]. Yet the more immediate risk lies not in the bias of the model but in the asymmetry of access: if advanced analytical tools are available to the committees and the Secretariat but not to individual deputies, or to the majority but not to the opposition, the balance of information within the chamber shifts in a way that the standing orders do not address. The uniform application of the House policy to all members' offices and the Inter-Parliamentary Union guidance on literacy for all members indicate the solution: the joint act should guarantee every deputy and senator equal access to parliamentary artificial intelligence tools and to training in their use, treating this access as an element of the guarantees of the mandate [2; 10; 19]. Data governance rules must accompany this guarantee, since enlarging the circle of users enlarges the risk of leakage of citizens' personal data contained in appeals and of information restricted under the Law on Personal Data [31].

Finally, the programme's provisions on anomaly detection in budgetary oversight and on the analysis of citizens' appeals connect the internal use of artificial intelligence with the oversight function regulated by the Law on Parliamentary Oversight [32]. The executive branch is deploying artificial intelligence across public administration under the Strategy until 2030; a parliament equipped with comparable analytical capacity is able to verify governmental reports, to detect inconsistencies in budget execution and to examine the algorithmic decisions of ministries on an equal informational footing. The government hour of 8 October 2025, which gave rise to the parliamentary programme, demonstrates the reciprocal logic: oversight of the executive's use of the technology generates the demand for the legislature's own capacity, and that capacity in turn strengthens oversight [23; 25]. The legal form of this connection should be a standing obligation of the Government to report annually to the chambers on the artificial intelligence systems in use in public administration, mirrored by the parliament's own public register.

CONCLUSION

The comparative analysis shows that parliaments have adopted three governance models for artificial intelligence: administrative-policy governance under committee oversight in the United States Congress, in-house development with institutional ownership of models and data in Brazil, and low-risk-first deployment moving from archives and record-keeping towards the legislative core in the European Parliament and the parliaments of Estonia, the Netherlands, Finland and Italy. All three converge on the same legal invariant articulated by the Inter-Parliamentary Union Guidelines: the algorithm prepares, the human decides, and responsibility for the decision remains with the constitutional actor. The programme of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of 13 April 2026 is, by international standards, an ambitious and well-sequenced document that combines the institutional distribution of responsibility characteristic of the American model with the technological self-sufficiency characteristic of the Brazilian one.

To give this programme a secure legal foundation the article proposes a joint act of the chambers of the Oliy Majlis on the use of artificial intelligence in parliamentary activity, accompanied by amendments to their standing orders. The act should apply to parliament itself the labelling duty and the prohibition of decisions based solely on algorithmic conclusions established by the Law of 21 January 2026; fix the advisory status of machine-generated analysis and preserve the signed conclusion of the human expert as the sole legally significant result of expertise; establish a public register of parliamentary artificial intelligence systems and make the marking of algorithmically analysed bills visible in the published text; guarantee equal access of all deputies and senators to such tools as an element of the mandate; and institute an annual governmental report to the chambers on the use of artificial intelligence in public administration. Realized in this form, the integration of artificial intelligence would not merely accelerate the work of the Oliy Majlis but would consolidate the constitutional principles of transparency, accountability and the personal responsibility of the elected representative in a technological environment that otherwise tends to obscure them.

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